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The End of the Czech Miracle?
Currency Crisis Reveals Need for Institutional Reforms
by Claudia M. Buch and Ralph P. Heinrich
CONTENTS
• After years of high growth, low unemployment and low inflation, the Czech econ-
omy has suffered a sudden setback. Speculative attacks on the currency have
forced the Central Bank to abandon its fixed exchange rate. The government has
now announced austerity measures to reduce the massive current account deficit.
In the short run, these measures will lead to lower growth and higher unemploy-
ment. Moreover, the devaluation of the Czech Koruna will make it more difficult to
further reduce inflation.
• The crisis is due in part to the previous boom in domestic absorption. The expan-
sion of absorption has been fuelled by massive capital inflows which helped to
maintain the fixed exchange rate. At the same time, productivity growth has been
sluggish despite high investment-to-GDP ratios, and wages have increased sub-
stantially despite sluggish productivity growth. These developments have contri-
buted to the overvaluation of the exchange rate. As a result, the competitiveness
of the tradables sector has been weakened, and the current account deficit has
widened dramatically. The policy measures now announced aim at reducing dom-
estic demand by cutting fiscal expenditure, raising taxes, devaluing the currency,
and containing wage growth in the public sector.
• However, the government has so far failed to address the microeconomic issues
that are at the heart of these supply-side problems. These include inefficiencies in
financial intermediation, ineffective bankruptcy procedures, and weaknesses in
the corporate governance of enterprises resulting from mass privatization.
• Solutions to the problems in the banking and financial sector should comprise tax
incentives for banks to provision for loan losses, decentralized debt restructuring,
the streamlining of bankruptcy proceedings, upgrading of the court system's re-
sources, and a greater political will to enforce the existing bankruptcy legislation.
Opening up for foreign banks more decisively and in particular allowing foreign
banks to participate in the privatization of the large commercial banks can help to
improve the efficiency of the banking system and the corporate governance role
of banks. In order to encourage funds to manage their portfolios for the benefit of
investors, funds should be encouraged to register as open-end unit trusts rather
than as joint stock companies.
• On the macroeconomic level, the government is moving in the right direction. As
regards the medium term outlook, fundamentals of the Czech economy remain
strong. However, decisive and timely action to improve the institutional framework
is needed if the economy is to overcome the present crisis and to reach a new,
sustainable growth path.
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Until recently, economic reformers in other
transition economies have been envious of the
Czech Republic. Unemployment rates remained
by far the lowest in the region, reaching 3.5
percent as of December 1996 (Table 1). In-
flation, which has stubbornly hovered above 20
percent in most reform countries, has not ex-
ceeded single digits since 1994 in the Czech
Republic. The economy grew at a 5 percent rate
in both 1995 and 1996 on the basis of fixed in-
vestment rates almost comparable to those of
the fast-growing economies in South-East Asia.
These achievements have appeared to be sound-
ly based on a macroeconomic policy package
involving balanced budgets, a tight monetary
policy, and a nominal exchange rate that had
been fixed relative to a currency basket since
1991.
The spectacular performance of the Czech
economy seems now to have come to a sudden
end. The current account deficit has been wide-
ning since 1994. Net capital inflows, which had
soared in 1994 and 1995, started to dwindle in
1996. Several policy measures designed to re-
duce the current account imbalance, such as the
announcement of reduced government spending
and the introduction of deposit requirements for
importers, remained ineffective. International
investors attacked the fixed exchange rate. With-
in only a few days, the Central Bank suffered a
massive loss of foreign currency reserves. On
May 27, the Bank was forced to abolish the ex-
change rate target and to let the exchange rate
float. The government has since plunged into
disarray over austerity measures needed to cor-
rect the external imbalance. Several govern-
ment officials have been replaced. As a result
of the devaluation and the austerity measures,
economic growth must be expected to slow
down markedly, while inflationary pressure and
unemployment will rise.
Table 1 - Key Macroeconomic Variables for the Czech Republic, 1992-1997
GDP growth (percent)
Budget balance (percent of GDP)
Unemployment rate (percent)
Consumer price inflation (percent)
a
Producer price inflation (percent)
8
Growth rate of M2 (percent)
a
Official reserves (bn US-$)
Current account balance (percent of GDP)









Trade balance (bn US-$)
Export growth (percent)
Import growth (percent)
aDecember over December of the previous year






































































































Source: CNB (1997a, 1997b), EBRD (1996), PlanEcon (1997a, 1997b, 1997c).Balance of payments crises have plagued
emerging market economies, most notably in
Latin America, on and off. In Central and East-
ern Europe, Hungary suffered a similar crisis
episode in 1995. These crises are usually ex-
plained by a combination of adverse external
shocks, inconsistent macroeconomic policies
and a lack of microeconomic reforms. Under-
standing why the Czech Republic, which until
recently has been considered a model reformer,
has now suffered the same fate holds crucial
lessons for emerging market economies else-
where. In what follows we argue that while ex-
ternal shocks and macroeconomic policy errors
have contributed to the present crisis in the
Czech Republic, the failure to push forward key
institutional and microeconomic reforms is one
of the main reasons for the deteriorating per-
formance. Other transition economies such as
Hungary and Poland have arguably made great-
er progress in these areas, have used the ex-
change rate more flexibly in order to reduce
real exchange rate appreciation, and have reac-
ted to balance of payments problems more
timely.
II. The Czech Economy in Spring 1997
Prior to the currency crisis of May 1997, the
performance of the Czech economy had already
started to deteriorate. The current account bal-
ance worsened significantly (Figure 1), growth
forecasts had to be revised downward, tax rev-
enue declined, and the fiscal deficit increased
in the first months of 1997. Behind the wide-
ning current account deficit in 1996 were both
a modest increase in merchandise exports (1.4
percent) and a relatively rapid increase in im-
ports (9.9 percent) which pushed the trade defi-
cit to $5.9 billion (Table 1). This stands against
a surplus in the balance of services ($1.8 bil-
lion) and a deficit in the balance of transfer
payments (-$0.8 billion). In the first quarter of
1997, the growth of merchandise exports even
turned negative (-3.7 percent) while imports
continued to grow (3.4 percent) as compared to
the same period of the previous year.
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Source: IMF (1996), CNB (1997a).Apart from a deteriorating cost competi-
tiveness of Czech exporters, demand factors ex-
plain these developments as well. Slower
growth in the main exports markets of Western
Europe, coupled with a rapid growth of aggre-
gate domestic demand by 9.4 percent in 1996,
mainly driven by fixed investment (12.4 per-
cent) and personal consumption (6 percent)
(PlanEcon 1997a: 12), let imports grow faster
than exports. In 1996, as in previous years, im-
Figure 2 - Nominal and Real Exchange Rates, 1989-1997
a
a. Nominal Exchange Rates to the US-Dollar
b
ports of investment goods accounted for a rela-
tively high share of about 40 percent of total
imports (CNB 1997a). These imports of ma-
chinery and equipment are mainly used for in-
frastructure projects and thus improve invest-
ment conditions in the medium to long run.
In May 1997, the current account deficit,
which had reached more than $1.4 billion in the
first quarter of 1997 (CSU 1997), finally be-
came unsustainable. As capital imports were in-
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aFor Poland and Hungary Jan 1990=100; for the Czech Republic Jan 1991=100. A depreciation
is shown as a decline of the curve. — ^For Poland see the right scale.
Source: IMF (1997), PlanEcon (1997a, 1997b, 1997c).sufficient to finance excess expenditure abroad,
foreign reserves of the Central Bank declined
from $12.4 billion at the end of 1996 to slightly
above $10 billion as of late May. An attempt of
the Bank to stop the decline in reserves by
raising its Lombardrate from 14 to 50 percent,
hereby pushing the overnight rate on the Czech
money market to almost 500 percent, remained
rather ineffective.
Finally, the Central Bank was decided to
abandon the exchange rate band and to let the
currency float since May 27. After the Czech
Koruna had already been allowed to float with-
in a margin of H-/-7.5 percent vis-a-vis a basket
of D-mark and US-dollar since February 1996,
a six-year period of nominal exchange rate
stability has thus come to an end. Eventually, a
renewed currency peg to the D-mark is envis-
aged, but no details have been announced as
yet. Following the abandoning of the exchange
rate target, the Koruna devalued by 12 percent
against the D-mark and 10 percent against the
US-dollar (Figure 2a); compared to the end of
1996, the devaluation against the dollar
amounted to 21 percent.
In the following, we will first analyze the in-
tegration of the Czech Republic into the inter-
national capital market during the past years
and outline the policy responses to increased
capital inflows. We will then discuss the de-
velopments in the Czech banking and financial
sector in more detail in order to show how
these insights help to improve our understand-
ing of the present situation.
III. A Victim of External Shocks?
In view of the Czech Republic's apparently
sound macroeconomic situation during the first
years of the transformation process, one might
be tempted to argue that the attack on the Czech
currency had fairly little to do with fundamen-
tals, and that it has been the (random) decision
of large international institutional investors to
withdraw their funds which has put the Czech
Republic on the verge of a currency crisis. If
this were true, little could be done domestically
to shield the economy from volatile inter-
national capital flows, and restrictions on capi-
tal controls might have to be introduced. A re-
cent empirical study has indeed found that cur-
rency crises are contagious to some extent
(Eichengreen et al. 1996). However, the authors
still concluded that it is fundamentals which ex- >
plain the overwhelming share of the probability
that a currency crisis occurs. In their study,
contagion is explained as "an increase in the
probability of a speculative attack on the dom-
estic currency which stems not from domestic
"fundamentals" [...] but from the existence of a
[...] speculative attack elsewhere in the world"
(p. 474) (emphasis added).
If defined in this pure sense, contagion
would occur completely randomly, and inves-
tors would entirely disregard fundamentals. If
one assumes that information about economic
fundamentals is scarce, and if the collection of
information implies substantial costs, it may in-
deed be rational to update information only
occasionally. Actions of some investors or
events elsewhere in the world may then induce
investors to withdraw funds from seemingly
similar economies but, at the same time, to
improve their information about fundamentals.
This suggests a wider definition of the con-
tagion effect, according to which fundamentals
are taken into account.
1 The fact that the Czech
crisis coincided with attacks on foreign ex-
change reserves elsewhere in the world (e.g. in
Thailand) suggests that such an adjustment
mechanism may have taken place. Because
these events occurred in response to similar
evolutions of fundamentals (widening current
account deficits, declining growth prospects),
the pure contagion hypothesis would not hold.
Rather, we need to explain developments in
fundamentals in order to understand why in-
ternational investors lost confidence in the
Czech Republic.IV. Integration into the International Capital Market
Since 1993, the transition economies in Central
and Eastern Europe have successfully accessed
the international financial market, and the
Czech Republic has been one of the main ben-
eficiaries. Net capital inflows into the transition
economies grew constantly
2 from a negligible
$0.5 billion in 1989 to $42.2 billion in 1995
(Table 2).
3 Capital inflows particularly surged
in 1995, putting them at 5.8 percent relative to
GDP in the region as a whole.
4 Not burdened
by a large amount of foreign debt like Poland or
Hungary, the Czech Republic has been able to
attract sizable capital inflows, which peaked at
18.3 percent of GDP in 1995 (Table 3). Long-
term capital inflows have been likewise im-
pressive, reaching 7.5 percent of GDP between
1992 and 1996.
5 These values substantially
exceed those observed during other capital
inflow episodes (Schadler et al. 1993). Since
they reflect to a large extent the adjustment to a
new equilibrium, they are unlikely to be sus-
tained at this high level of the past.
6
Table 2 - Net Capital Flows to Transition Economies, 1989-1996 (billion dollar)
a
















































aNet capital flows = capital account (credit - debit) plus financial account (liabilities - assets) of the balance of payments,
excluding changes in official reserves; positive numbers indicate net inflows. — bData for 1996 were drawn from national
statistics and may not be entirely comparable to earlier data. —
 cFormer Czechoslovakia prior to 1993. — din 1996, the
government and the Central Bank repaid foreign debt by the amount of $2.8 billion. During the same period, net foreign
debt of the business sector and net foreign direct investment in Hungary increased. —
 eEuropean developing countries as
defined by the IMF minus Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey and non-specified countries.
Source: CNB (1997a: 83), NBP (1996b: 35), NBH (1997: 99), IMF (1996), own calculations.
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 cIn 1996, Hungary reported net capital exports of $1.
of foreign loans through the National Bank and the government.
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Source: IMF (1996), NBH (1997), NBP (1996b), World Bank (1997).The integration of the Czech Republic into
the international capital market has been pro-
moted by a gradual move towards greater cur-
rent and capital account convertibility.
7 Gener-
ally, the country has followed a sequence of
liberalization measures which is common to al-
most all transition economies: parallel to the
liberalization of domestic prices, the foreign
trade monopoly was abolished in 1990, and the
domestic currency was made internally convert-
ible for current account transactions. Quantita-
tive restrictions on foreign trade flows were
fully abolished in January 1991. Yet, Article
VIII of the IMF has been signed only in Oc-
tober 1995. Capital account transactions are
subject to tighter restrictions than those of the
current account: while capital inflows were lib-
eralized fairly soon, in particular in connec-
tion with foreign direct investments (FDI), re-
strictions on capital outflows are being main-
tained. The substantial liberalization of current
account transactions, however, has weakened
the ability of the authorities to enforce capital
controls. Uncertainty surrounding the start of
economic reforms in 1990 and the separation
from the Slovak Republic in 1992/93 precipi-
tated outflows of private capital — despite re-
latively rigid restrictions on capital flows
(Hrncir 1997b: 7-8). Also in 1995 did the CNB
fail to contain total capital inflows by restrict-
ing short-term capital imports because banks
simply raised the maturity of contracts slightly
above the threshold level of one year.
Although inward FDI is generally unrestrict-
ed, some important sectors, notably the bank-
ing sector, have been excluded. Foreign banks
have been allowed to establish subsidiaries and
to buy stakes in domestic banks since 1990.
However, branches can only be opened since
the beginning of 1992. A permission of the
Czech National Bank is needed for the acqui-
sition of a domestic bank (CNB 1995). Yet,
after the Czech banking sector came into dis-
tress in late 1993 and in the first months of
1994, the issuance of new licenses for domestic
as well as for foreign banks was stopped in
mid-1994. Even during this period, foreign
banks could acquire stakes in existing domestic
banks (CNB 1994a). Reportedly, however, de-
mand has been fairly low. In early 1996, the
National Bank started to grant new licenses to
foreign banks, but future market access will
remain regulated. A similar moratorium on
foreign bank licenses as in the Czech Republic
had been imposed in Poland while market entry
of foreign banks was handled quite liberally in
Hungary.
Capital account convertibility has been
pushed forward in 1994 in all Visegrad coun-
tries. This move towards greater capital account
convertibility has been prompted by increased
capital inflows and thus by market forces on the
one hand and by the intention to join the OECD
and to accept the convertibility requirements of
the IMF on the other hand (Backe 1996). In the
Czech Republic, the needed regulatory changes
came into force with the new foreign exchange
law of October 1995 (CNB 1995). In the con-
text of OECD membership, it is envisaged to
abolish remaining capital controls within the
coming five years. Inward portfolio investment
in bonds and equity is generally permitted but
the placement of securities on the domestic mar-
ket by foreigners usually requires a permission.
Medium and long-term financial credits have
been liberalized in most of the advanced reform
states; Czech residents can also borrow short-
term funds from abroad. As regards capital out-
flows, the Czech regime is the most liberal with
regard to real estate investment for residents,
which is largely restricted in Hungary or Po-
land.
Generally, the major restrictions that are be-
ing retained are repatriation requirements for
foreign currency obtained abroad by residents,
portfolio investment abroad, the opening of ac-
counts with foreign banks abroad, outward
financial credits, guarantees and the like, and
the sale and purchase of domestic currency a-
broad. A safeguard clause is included in the
Czech foreign exchange legislation, allowing
the authorities to impose deposit requirements
on capital inflows for a maximum period of
three months.
A far-reaching liberalization of capital flows
as in the Czech Republic may lead to unsus-
tainable current account deficits, excessive real
exchange rate appreciation, and an increasedexposure to a sudden withdrawal of funds (Cho
and Khatkate 1989; Edwards 1987; Schadler et
al. 1993). This volatility of financial flows is
crucially affected by the share of foreign direct
investment and other long-term investments in
total capital (in)flows. Developing countries in
Asia where inflows of FDI have dominated, for
example, are usually considered to have a more
stable external balance than Latin American
countries where portfolio investment has been
more important. Because foreign direct invest-
ment typically occurs in the form of machinery
and fixed assets, it can less easily be withdrawn
than liquid portfolio investment.
Generally, the transition economies in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe have not attracted siz-
able amounts of portfolio investment until very
recently. Foreign direct investment and other
long-term investments, primarily through large
international finance institutions, have domi-
nated. This reduces the exposure of the region
as a whole to a sudden withdrawal of funds.
The stylized facts can be summarized as fol-
lows:
- In the years 1989 through 1995, flows of
foreign direct investment into the transition
economies reached in the aggregate almost 32
percent of total capital inflows (Table 3). They
thus substantially exceeded the world's average
of 17.9 percent. Generally, FDI was about as
important as in the average developing country.
At the same time, differences between tran-
sition economies are striking. FDI inflows have
been much more important in Hungary (61.7
percent of inflows) and Poland (39.8 percent)
than in the Czech Republic (21.9 percent).
- The smaller share of FDI in the Czech Re-
public is compensated by the fact that Czech
firms borrowed more funds from abroad than
their Hungarian and Polish counterparts. Since
1993, Czech enterprises have increasingly rais-
ed loans on the international capital market
(CNB 1994b). Between 1993 and 1995, loans
received from abroad by the non-financial cor-
porate sector have been much greater in the
Czech Republic ($3.8 billion) than in Hungary
($2.1 billion) or in Poland ($0.9 billion). Net
inflows of loans to enterprises and FDI had ap-
proximately the same volume in the Czech Re-
public during this period. In 1996, net borrow-
ing of Czech firms in the international capital
market exceeded (net) FDI inflows by 50 per-
cent and reached approximately $2 billion (55.6
billion CSK) (CNB 1997a: 30).
- With regard to the structure of inflows of
portfolio capital, the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary also differ substantially.
8 While portfolio
capital has been attracted into the Hungarian
economy mainly to finance the budget deficits
in 1993 and 1994, portfolio capital inflows into
the Czech Republic have been used to purchase
equity of the non-financial corporate sector
only.
- In the Czech Republic (between 1993 and
1995) and in Poland, the bulk of "other capital"
inflows comprised short-term loans to the
government which reached a share of 56 and 75
percent of other capital inflows, respectively. In
contrast to the Polish government, however, the
Czech authorities have also increased their
short-term foreign assets, hence the net contri-
bution of short-term government liabilities to
other investment inflows is very small.
- Although the Czech Republic entered the
transformation process with a much lower level
of foreign debt as compared to Hungary, at the
end of 1994 short-term debt over GDP was
even higher in the Czech Republic (8.7 percent)
than in Hungary (6.2 percent). Short-term debt
relative to GDP was almost negligible in
Poland (Table 3).
The structure of capital flows into the Czech
economy thus reveals both potentially destabi-
lizing and stabilizing elements. On the one
hand, the small share of foreign direct invest-
ment and the importance of short-term liabi-
lities in gross capital inflows may increase the
vulnerability to external shocks. Also, the fact
that Czech enterprises have quite substantially
borrowed from abroad raises their exposure to
foreign exchange rate risks. This holds in parti-
cular as the long-sustained fixed exchange rate
regime may have reduced the firms' sensitivity
to these risks (Hrncir 1997b). On the other
hand, the increase in short-term foreign liabi-
lities of the government has been compensated10
by an increase in short-term assets. The ma-
turity structure of foreign loans also has a po-
tentially stabilizing impact. Between 1993 and
1995, the vast majority (94 percent) of all loans
raised abroad by firms were long-term funds
(IMF 1996). Hence, the fact that the Czech Re-
public has liberalized not only medium and
long-term financial credits (like Hungary and
Poland) but also short-term loans has not raised
the exposure to short-term borrowing risks. Fi-
nally, the fact that portfolio investment has
been concentrated on equity investments is gen-
erally welcome because, unlike debt, it does not
generate a fixed interest burden independent of
the performance of the economy. Under other-
wise identical conditions, this type of capital
inflow can therefore be sustained for longer
periods than inflows into securitized debt.
V. Real Exchange Rate and Competitiveness
The sustainability of capital inflows not only
depends on their structure but also on the
underlying competitiveness of the recipient
economy. This, in turn, is reflected in its real
exchange rate. Generally, transition countries
initially face the twin challenges of stabilizing
the internal value of their currencies and at the
same time opening up their economies to the
world market. The former requires a credible
restrictive monetary policy, while the latter
necessitates an appreciation of the real ex-
change rate towards its open economy equili-
brium. Experience from developing countries
suggests that these two goals may conflict with
each other as the transition unfolds.
Like almost all other transition economies,
the Czech Republic has used the nominal ex-
change rate as an anchor for its stabilization
program. Since the beginning of the reform pro-
cess in 1991, the Czech National Bank had
been able to defend a fixed exchange rate
which allowed the value of the Czech Koruna
to fluctuate around a basket of currencies only
by a narrow margin of +/-0.5 percent, although
the commitment to defend this rate was never
binding (Hrncir 1997a). The basket has com-
prised the D-mark (65 percent) and the US-
dollar (35 percent) since May 1993. The ration-
ale behind this policy was that the fixed rate,
coupled with a liberalization of the current ac-
count, would immediately reduce inflation by
tying the domestic prices of tradable goods to
their world market levels. By immediately re-
ducing the inflation in tradable goods prices,
the relative price of non-tradables would rise,
and demand would shift out of non-tradables
into tradables. As a result, prices would start to
come down in the non-tradables sector as well,
eventually leading domestic inflation to con-
verge to inflation in the anchor currency
country. Thus, a nominal exchange rate target
would reduce inflationary expectations and
would contain the real cost of weaning the
economy away from inflationary habits.
Since the relative (shadow) prices of non-
tradables were artificially low in transition econ-
omies prior to their opening up to the world
market, a real appreciation has been desirable
from the point of view of structural adjustment
as well. A real appreciation serves to integrate
the economy into the international division of
labor by allowing it to import some of the trad-
ables it used to produce at home and to free re-
sources for the production of additional non-
tradables. Such an appreciation is all the more '
necessary if part of the investment needed to
finance economic development is to come from
net capital imports. Moreover, as economic de-
velopment progresses, productivity growth in
the tradables sector usually tends to outpace
productivity growth in the non-tradables sector.
This further raises the equilibrium real ex-
change rate in small economies and warrants a
further real appreciation.
However, numerous stabilization programs
based on nominal exchange rate anchors ran in-
to problems when an excessive real apprecia-
tion eroded the cost competitiveness of do-
mestic exporting and import competing indus-
tries and thus created unsustainable current ac-<11
count deficits.
9 Under such circumstances, the
dependency of the economy on net foreign
capital inflows rises. Once foreign investors
start to question the sustainability of the coun-
try's balance of payments position, the nominal
exchange rate comes under pressure. The ap-
propriate policy response would be to reduce
domestic absorption by tightening fiscal policy
and to facilitate a switch of expenditure
towards exports by devaluing the currency
(Schadler et al. 1993). By contrast, attempts to
defendj the nominal exchange rate by raising
interest rates without fiscal tightening are self-
defeating since they encourage additional in-
flows of short-term speculative capital. This
serves to delay the necessary correction of the
external imbalance at the cost of exacerbating
the real overvaluation and widening the current
account deficit. When capital flows reverse, the
squeeze on domestic absorption will have to be
all the more sudden and severe. The policy les-
son from numerous attempts at exchange-rate-
based stabilization therefore is that once signs
of a real overvaluation appear, trying to defend
the nominal exchange rate risks making matters
worse, at least unless accompanied by signifi-
cant fiscal tightening. A more flexible exchange
rate regime such as a crawling peg with wide
bands is needed.
How fast a currency becomes overvalued,
though, depends crucially on two factors. First,
real appreciation under a nominal anchor will
be the faster the more slowly domestic inflation
converges to the international level. The speed
of inflation convergence in turn depends on the
degree of inflation inertia which can be due to
explicit wage and price indexation schemes
and, not least, to policy inconsistencies which
reduce the credibility of the anti-inflation
stance.
1
0 But, secondly, domestic price and
wage inflation will not erode the competitive-
ness of the tradables sector if they are accom-
panied by corresponding gains in factor and
particularly labor productivity. In this case, the
equilibrium real exchange rate appreciates. It is
therefore absolutely crucial for economic pol-
icy to provide conditions conducive for invest-
ment to increase along with capital inflows and
for funds to be invested efficiently.
In keeping with the lesson that a rather flex-
ible approach to the nominal exchange rate can
reduce the risk of balance of payment crises,
Poland abandoned its nominal anchor in early
1991 and has since followed a crawling peg.
Hungary at first devalued in periodic discretion-
ary steps. Starting in the spring of 1995, a crawl-
ing peg was introduced there as well. By con-
trast, the Czech authorities have not allowed
greater exchange rate flexibility for a prolonged
period of time, after it had devalued its cur-
rency in 1990/91. It was only in late February
1996 that the Czech monetary authorities de-
cided to widen the band to +1-1.5 percent
relative to the currency basket in response to
the massive capital inflows of 1995. This move
precipitated an outflow of short-term capital
and a loss of foreign exchange reserves of the
National Bank, mainly in the first half of 1996
(CNB 1997a: 30).
Real exchange rates have risen substantially
in all transition countries. However, the degree
of real overvaluation, if any, is difficult to
gauge. Most countries initially devalued their
nominal and in their wake their real exchange
rates. An exception to this is Hungary where
the nominal devaluation was insufficient to de-
preciate the real exchange rate. According to
estimates by Halpern and Wyplosz (1995), the
degree of initial real undervaluation was par-
ticularly pronounced in former Czechoslovakia.
Hence, the scope for equilibrium real exchange
rate appreciation would appear to have been
greater in the Czech Republic than for instance
in Hungary or in Poland. In fact, real apprecia-
tion as measured by the consumer price index
has actually been less over the 1990-1996
period (Figure 2b). However, starting in 1993,
real appreciation has been fastest in the Czech
Republic.
An indicator for the movement of the equili-
brium real exchange rate is unit labor costs in
the tradables sector as measured in foreign cur-
rency (Table 4). On this measure, the competi-
tiveness of the tradables sector suffered an un-
abated and significant deterioration in the
Czech Republic throughout the 1991-1996
period. This is in marked contrast to develop-
ments particularly in Hungary where, after a12
sharp initial rise, unit labor costs have been de-
clining since 1992. That competitiveness in the
Czech tradables sector has been deteriorating is
suggested also by a look at its trade balance
(Table 1). Export growth has been slower in the
Czech Republic than in Hungary or Poland in
the 1994—1996 period and has turned negative
in early 1997.
Table 4 - Unit Labor Costs, Labor Productivity, and Real















































































Source: EBRD (1996), IMF (1997).
Three factors are behind the large increase in
unit labor costs in the Czech Republic (Table
4). First, labor productivity growth has been re-
latively flat compared to Hungary or Poland.
1
1
This indicates that the equilibrium level of the
real exchange rate has likely risen more slowly
in the Czech Republic than in some other tran-
sition economies. By implication, the same rate
of real appreciation would cause an overvalu-
ation more quickly in the Czech Republic than
in other economies. Second, real wages have
risen by 45 percent since 1992 and have thus
outpaced real wages in Poland and Hungary.
1
2
These problems are particularly acute in the
government sector and in state-owned firms,
where productivity growth has been below-
average while nominal wage increases tended
to be above-average (PlanEcon 1997a). And
third, the Czech currency has remained stable
in nominal terms while Hungary and Poland
have allowed some of the real wage gains to be
offset by nominal exchange rate depreciation.
Hence, in view of the actual development of the
real exchange rate in the Czech Republic, the
attempt to give more flexibility to the exchange
rate by widening the exchange rate band in
early 1996 may have been too little too late. >
In light of the experience with earlier bal-
ance of payments crises, the questions arise
why has productivity growth not been faster
and why have wages risen so much ahead of
productivity? The former problem may appear
particularly puzzling in light of the high rate of
fixed capital formation in the Czech Re-
public.
1
3 It has stood at around 30 percent of
GDP. The Czech Republic is the only transition
economy which comes close to the fast growing
Asian economies in this regard. In contrast, in-
vestment ratios in most other countries have
been closer to 20 percent of GDP. This finding
points to a problem in the efficient allocation of
domestic and foreign savings as a possible
cause of sluggish productivity growth.
The failure of wages to rise by no more than
productivity growth can hardly be ascribed to
implicit indexation or excessive inflationary ex-
pectations in the Czech case, since both the
initial correction of the price level and sub-
sequent inflation have been moderate by com-
parison with other transition countries or
emerging market economies in Latin America.
Instead, it reflects weaknesses in the corporate
governance of enterprises. Hence microecon-
omic inefficiencies play a key role in explain-
ing the present Czech crisis. Thus far, however,
economic policy has responded to the crisis
mainly on the macroeconomic level, notably
monetary policy, while fiscal and institutional
reforms have lagged behind.13
VI. Macroeconomic Policy Responses
The CNB struggled to sterilize capital inflows
in order to prevent them from fueling inflation,
but this became increasingly difficult. Gener-
ally, sterilization can be defined in a narrow
sense, implying that increases in the monetary
base due to inflows of foreign reserves are
compensated by reductions in domestic credit
(Hrncir 1997b). Sterilization in a broader sense
mainly comprises adjustments in the money
multiplier through changes in minimum reserve
requirements and shifts of government deposits
to the Central Bank, but also diminished re-
financing facilities. In the years 1993-1995, the
increase in net foreign assets of the CNB ex-
ceeded the increase in the total monetary base
by 26 percent. Hence, net domestic assets were
reduced in an effort to sterilize capital inflows.
In 1996, in contrast, net foreign assets declined
by less than the monetary base, reflecting an in-
crease in net domestic assets. The decline in
foreign exchange reserves mainly occurred in
the first half of the year as short-term capital
was exported in response to the widening of the
exchange rate band in February (CNB 1997a:
30). The CNB has furthermore raised minimum
reserve requirements successively from 1994
onwards
1
4 and induced banks to shift govern-
ment deposits to the Central Bank mainly in
1995. Overall, however, open market opera-
tions have been more important as a tool to re-
duce the domestic money stock.
In 1994 and 1995, sterilization policies have
been relatively effective and have imposed re-
latively small costs on the Czech economy
(Hrncir 1997b). Estimates indicate that the
CNB through its open market operations and
reserve policies has indeed been able to affect
total money supply;
1
5 the quasi-fiscal costs
1
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of the sterilization measures have been put at
0.3-0.5 percent of GDP in these years. Yet,
sterilization became increasingly expensive and
ineffective, as the turnaround in monetary and
exchange rate policies in 1996 and in the first
months of 1997 illustrates. It must be borne in
mind that sterilized intervention in response to
capital inflows tends to raise the level of do-
mestic interest rates and thus triggers additional
capital inflows. Besides, raising minimum re-
serve requirements is a fairly distortionary in-
strument of monetary policy since it distorts the
asset management of commercial banks and im-
poses a tax on the banking system.
Adjustments of monetary and exchange rate
policies alone are insufficient responses to in-
creased capital inflows and widening current
account deficits. The interesting point about the
Czech case is that the attack on the Koruna in
May 1997 was not a response to inconsistent
fiscal and monetary policies in the conventional
sense. Typically, speculative attacks on fixed
exchange rate regimes are encountered when
central banks finance large budget deficits
through excessive money creation (Agenor et
al. 1992). Although the Czech government did
not run fiscal deficits, fiscal policy failed to
counteract the strong demand expansion in the
private sector (Figures 3a and 3b). Domestic
absorption has been fueled by substantial real
wage growth and strong Investment demand. In
order to reduce it, a comprehensive policy
package, including fiscal adjustment, wage mo-
deration, and structural reforms is called for. In
view of the large capital inflows, in particular
in 1995, a fiscal surplus might have been more
appropriate (Hrncir 1997b).
Since April 1997, the government has started
to respond to the widening current account
deficit and the loss of foreign currency reserves
of the Central Bank by implementing some
emergency measures (PlanEcon 1997a; CNB
1997b; NZZ of 30.5.1997):
1
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- In early April, the government decided to re-
duce planned spending for the year, to put a
cap on public sector wages, and to impose
restrictions on the purchase of certain con-
sumer goods. More specifically, 20 percent
of the value of imports must be deposited at
an interest-free account for 180 days.
- In late May 1997, after the abolition of the
fixed exchange rate, it was decided to lower14
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Source: CNB (1997a), EBRD (1996).
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government expenditure to achieve a balanced
budget in 1997 and a small surplus in 1998.
Imports financed through the budget shall be
reduced significantly. A wage freeze on public
sector wages is to be imposed; wage moder-
ation in the private sector shall be negotiated.
The above measures are appropriate to re-
duce domestic absorption and to correct the real
overvaluation of the exchange rate. To some
extent, the Czechs follows the Hungarian ex-
ample. To correct its external disequilibrium,
Hungary was forced to introduce an austerity
program in March 1995. The government cut
budget expenditures, raised taxes, instituted an
import tax surcharge and devalued the currency
by 9 percent. Subsequently, it shifted from a
policy of discretionary devaluations to a pre-an-
nounced crawling peg in an attempt to preserve
the competitiveness of the Forint without fore-
going its role as a nominal anchor. This aus-
terity package cost Hungary some output growth
in 1995 and 1996, but helped the country to suc-
cessfully avert a full-fledged crisis along Mexi-
can lines. In the Czech Republic, such macro-
economic adjustment may be insufficient to
solve the underlying microeconomic causes of
the crisis. Although the intention to tackle insti-
tutional reforms was stated, concrete proposals
are lacking as yet.
1
8 Solving the problems in
the banking and financial sector seems parti-
cularly important in order to improve the cor-
porate governance and the restructuring of firms.
VII. Banking and Balance of Payments Problems: Another Twin Crisis?
Kaminsky and Reinhard (1996) have recently
provided evidence that banking and balance of
payments crises are closely linked. They ana-
lyze crises episodes in 20 developed and devel-
oping countries for the 1970s through the 1990s
and find some common features. In contrast to
the 1970s, banking and balance of payments
crises have become increasingly common lately
in response to the increasing globalization of
financial markets. While the causality between
the two types of crises is not clear-cut from a
theoretical point of view, the empirical evi-
dence suggests that — if anything — banking
crises help to predict balance of payments
crises, and not vice versa. At the same time,
similar domestic and external shocks help to
predict both types of crises. Among the do-
mestic shocks are a weakening of the export
sector, high real interest rates, a decline in the
stock market, or an increase in the money
multiplier. Finally, most of the banking crises
studied were preceded by domestic financial
liberalization policies.15
The situation of the transition economies in
Central and Eastern Europe quite closely re-
sembles some of the common features of finan-
cial crises. Quite encompassing programs of in-
ternal and external financial liberalization were
launched at the beginning of the reform pro-
cess, and the reforms of the domestic banking




the crises indicators, no clear picture emerges
in the Czech Republic. On the one hand, export
growth slowed down considerably in 1996
(Table 1). Also, the stock index declined prior
to the crisis. On the other hand, neither an in-
crease in the money multiplier nor an increase
in real lending rates (starting from relatively
high levels) could be observed.
Yet, the developments in the banking sector
are of particular interest. In the Czech Re-
public, banking reform got ahead of compar-
able countries such as Hungary and Poland at
the beginning of the reform process but slowed
down considerably later on. Both with regard to
the solution to the stock problem of non-per-
forming loans and to the privatization of state-
owned banks did the Czechs act relatively
quickly. After a two-tier banking system was
established in 1990, inherited low-interest loans,
which had been granted under central planning
to finance inventories, were taken off the bal-
ance sheets of the successor banks of the mono-
bank, and the banks were recapitalized by
government bonds (Consolidation Program I).
The loans in question were taken over by the
newly founded, state-owned Consolidation
Bank; the costs of recapitalization were covered
through privatization revenues. Further recap-
italizations followed later on, but the authori-
ties made sure that only inherited bad loans
were covered. Bank privatization started in
1992 as the state-owned banks were included in
the voucher privatization scheme.
Yet, other important reforms of the banking
sector were not pushed forward decisively
enough. Bank privatization remained incom-
plete because only about 50 percent of the
banks' shares were included in the voucher pri-
vatization; the remaining shares are being re-
tained by the government, mainly through its
National Property Fund. After a new banking
law had been passed in 1991, further measures
to improve the supervision of the banking sys-
tem and banking legislation were substantially
delayed. At first, the creation of loan loss pro-
visions was not based on a case-by-case assess-
ment of the loan portfolio. Banks established a
general provision instead. New reporting sys-
tems for asset quality and loan loss provision-
ing became mandatory only in the second half
of 1994. These reporting systems require banks
to base loan classification on indicators such as
the duration of the payments delay and the qual-
ity of the borrower. These regulatory changes
had partly come in response to mounting sol-
vency problems in the Czech banking industry.
They brought the true scale of the non-per-
forming loans problem to the surface and in-
duced the Central Bank to impose a moratorium
on new banking licenses. Because also foreign
banks have been affected, new entry of foreign
banks into the Czech banking sector was pre-
vented for more than two years between 1994
and 1996, and foreign participation in the large
Czech banks has not actively been sought. As a
consequence, concentration ratios in the Czech
banking system remain comparatively high, the
large successor banks of the monobank do-
minate the market, and efficiency gains through




In contrast to Hungary and Poland, total clas-
sified loans in the Czech banking sector have
remained stubbornly high (Figure 4). At the"end
of 1996, they still accounted for more than 37
percent of total bank loans while their share
had been reduced to less than 20 percent in the
other two economies. These non-performing
loans are not only a legacy from the past. As of
May 1996, about 41 percent of all classified
loans were short-term loans that had been
granted within the past 12 months (CNB 1996).
Generally, a high share of non-performing as-
sets hampers the efficiency of the banking sys-
tem for various reasons (Buch 1996). Banks
burdened with risky assets are likely to raise in-
terest rate spreads, to reduce their overall lend-
ing, to invest into safe assets, and to potentially
bias lending towards their existing clients. By16









Source: CNB (1997a), SBS (1997), NBP (1996a), Buch (1996).
not writing off non-performing loans, the banks
realize an option value of waiting as they hope
to eventually recover some of their classified
loans. As a consequence, savings and invest-
ment are suppressed and new private enter-
prises may be rationed out of the market. Re-
cently, some positive developments seem to
have taken place in the Czech banking sector
with regard to the issue of non-performing
loans (CNB 1997a). Commercial banks have
written off some of their non-performing assets,
which has so far largely been discouraged by
tax legislation.
2
1 The quality of new lending
seems to have improved, and loan loss pro-
visions reach 34 percent of classified loans, the
remainder being backed by collateral. Yet, it
must be taken into account that the value and
the liquidity of assets which might serve as col-
lateral are highly uncertain in transition econ-
omies. In fact, Czech banks have thus far hardly
collected any collateral from their debtors. Ac-
cording to foreign auditors, non-performing
loans still threaten the solvency of Czech banks
to a substantial degree (Kapoor 1997) and thus
potentially distort lending decisions.
As a reflection of the problems in the bank-
ing sector, an open banking crisis could not
been averted anymore in 1995 and especially in
1996. At this point, a new bank consolidation
program (Consolidation Program II) was
launched which comprised the evaluation of
banks' loan portfolios, the restructuring of
banks, and the eventual extension of a deposit
insurance to depositors of insolvent banks.
Until mid-1996, the licenses of two banks had
been withdrawn, conservatorship had been im-
posed on three banks, four banks had been
merged with others, and seven banks were re-
capitalized through existing shareholders or
new investors (Matousek 1997). While liquidity
assistance had primarily been geared towards
the large successor banks of the monobank in
the Consolidation Program I, the new consoli-
dation program thus mainly targeted small and
medium-sized banks, accounting for roughly 10
percent of the banking system's assets (Hrncir
1997b: 24). In autumn 1996, the CNB and the
Czech government created a special financing
unit which is under the administration of the
Consolidation Bank, which takes over non-per-
forming loans from the banks in question, and
which undertakes the loan work out. The banks
have to repurchase the assets after 5-7 years
and are under special supervision by the CNB
throughout the duration of the scheme.17
In summary, early progress in banking sector
reform in the Czech Republic could not be ex-
ploited to effectively contain the emergence of
new bad loans. While gradualism in banking re-
form has been a common feature of all trans-
ition economies, reformers in Hungary and
Poland have at least in some areas produced
better results. In Hungary, for example, market
entry of foreign banks has been handled quite
liberally, thus improving the competitive situa-
tion in the banking system. Hence, the pro-
crastination of bank recapitalization and pri-
vatization may have been less harmful than in
the Czech Republic. Polish reformers have, as
in the Czech Republic, substantially delayed
bank privatization and the opening up for
foreign banks. In 1993, a loan consolidation
program was implemented in Poland which
seems to yield some positive results (Gray and
Holle 1996). By relying on decentralized debt
restructuring in special loan work-out depart-
ments of the commercial banks, the program
has tried to utilize the learning potential of the
banks. While loan work-out departments have
also been established in Czech banks, govern-
ment-initiated debt restructuring has mainly re-
lied on centralized solutions. Also, the Polish
program has strengthened the incentives of
banks to restructure bad loans by effectively
changing the seniority of claims.
In the Czech Republic, restricted market ac-
cess of foreign banks, coupled with a liberal re-
gime towards foreign borrowing, has potential-
ly increased the foreign exchange exposure of
the commercial banks that have intermediated
foreign loans of Czech firms.
2
2 Although the
final jury is still out, there are indications that
efficiency gains in the partly state-owned banks
through full privatization and foreign owner-
ship may have been sacrificed in favor of a pol-
itically motivated behavior of banks. Although
the state as an owner of the large commercial
banks does not interfere with the daily business
decisions of the banks, it does influence long-
term strategic decisions to a certain degree.
Empirical evidence from a case study of the
largest commercial bank, Komercni Banka, at
least does not lead to reject the hypothesis that
an implicit contract between the government
and the bank exists (Snyder and Kormendi
1996). This "contract" may explain why the
large banks have been relatively reluctant to re-
structure firms or to force them into bankruptcy
and why foreign competition has not been en-
couraged. Yet, in order to understand the role
of banks in corporate governance and in the re-
structuring of firms, a closer look at the speci-
fics of the Czech privatization process and capi-
tal markets is warranted.
VIII. Banks, Capital Markets, and the Restructuring of Firms
Commercial banks in the Czech Republic have
full-fledged universal banking licenses. They
can operate as commercial and investment banks
at the same time, and they can hold limited
amounts of equity in non-financial firms. With
regard to their role in corporate governance,
Czech banks also have an influence on firms
through their involvement in the investment
fund structure. The leading Czech banks found-
ed most of the investment privatization funds,
which collected the bulk of voucher points is-
sued to the population during mass privati-
zation. The funds invested these vouchers into
shares of the firms to be privatized.
Although over 300 investment companies
were originally founded, only about 50 of them
have played a significant role in the corporate
governance of firms through their board mem-
bership in privatized firms. Contrary to earlier
fears, mass privatization in the Czech Republic
has thus not led to widespread dispersed owner-
ship structures. Instead, in the first privatization
round, investment funds acquired 66.2 percent
of the total book value of Czech enterprises,
and 75 percent of the privatized firms were
characterized by concentrated ownership of in-
vestment funds of at least 30 percent (Matesova
and Seda 1994: 39-40). Because bank-con-18
trolled investment funds have collected about
60 percent of the voucher points of all funds in
the first privatization wave — this share having
gone down somewhat in the second wave
(Mejstrik 1994: 21) —, banks potentially play
an important role in corporate governance.
In the first privatization wave the funds had
to be incorporated by law as joint stock com-
panies. The original voucher owners became
owners of the privatization funds.
2
3 However,
ownership in the funds has been so dispersed
that investors have in fact had little control over
how the funds have been run. Instead, control
has rested with the funds management com-
panies. These are usually owned by the banks
who founded the funds in the first place.
Hence, while the funds are expected to control
firms, mechanisms to encourage the fund man-
agers to maximize shareholder value have re-
mained weak. Given the absence of an effective
voice at shareholder meetings, the main mech-
anism to influence funds managers should have
been exit. And indeed, hefty discounts on the
funds' share prices of up to 80 percent on the
market value of the underlying portfolios as
well as a considerable dispersion in the second-
ary market prices of different funds indicate
that many investors have taken that avenue.
2
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At the same time, persistently large discounts
suggest that some funds have been largely aloof
of the message sent by deserting shareholders.
They appear to be run more for the benefit of
the lending business of the banks owning the
respective fund management companies than
for the benefit of investors. This lack of interest
in keeping shareholders satisfied can be traced
to two factors. First, the funds are organized as
joint stock companies which are not required to
redeem the shares of investors at the market
value of the underlying portfolio. Second, the
funds' connections to banks allow them to stay
afloat without attracting new outside capital.
Roughly half the funds established for the
second privatization wave (1993) have been
founded as unit trusts rather than joint stock
companies (Egerer 1995). They are required to
redeem their shares on demand at the market
price of the underlying portfolio. Setting up
funds as unit trusts rather than joint stock com-
panies has been motivated on the one hand by
the high costs of convening shareholder meet-
ings, but on the other hand also by the disap-
pointment of investors with the high discounts
at which the shares of the original joint-stock
investment funds have been trading. The bulk
of the new funds has been set up as open-end
funds which means they can attract additional
capital from outside. This can be expected to
provide incentives to fund managers to generate
profits for shareholders in order to attract more
capital and to maximize proceeds from manage-
ment fees.
While the emergence of unit trust funds
tends to strengthen the role of the stock market
in providing corporate control via movements
in share prices, some funds established in the
first privatization wave, most notably some
non-bank-controlled funds, have moved the op-
posite way. They have transformed into holding
companies. Thereby, they are avoiding a 20
percent limit on stakes in any one company and
can consolidate their portfolios for active man-
agement.
To what extent banks use their power to im-
prove the performance of Czech enterprises and
thus to contribute to the success of the privati-
zation process cannot be evaluated definitively.
In principle, bank-owned investment funds are
less likely'to be liquidity-constrained than inde-
pendent investment funds and thus should be
able to take a long-term view of the enterprise's
affairs rather than maximizing short-run cash
flow (Brom and Orenstein 1994). However,
compared to non-bank-controlled investment
funds, bank-controlled funds tend to have rath-
er dispersed portfolios (Coffee 1994), indi-
cating that their strategy may be to manage
portfolios rather than to actively get involved in
the management of any enterprises.
Because the bank-controlled funds typically
hold rather diversified portfolios, their role in
the effective control of firms is limited by the
sheer lack of qualified personnel to fill board
seats. As a result, the bank-controlled funds
send representatives to the executive and super-
visory boards of firms less frequently than non-
bank-controlled funds do (Egerer 1995). De-
spite their presence on company boards, most19
funds have remained largely passive sharehol-
ders (Pistor and Spicer 1996). Moreover, con-
flicts of interest can arise between the invest-
ment fund management and the commercial
banking operations. Often, bank managers are
send to fill board seats. These managers have
incentives to recover as much as possible for
their loan business rather than to opt for high
dividends or for profits to be reinvested
(Matesova and Seda 1994: 19). Coffee (1994:
32) provides mixed evidence with regard to the
exchange of information between the commer-
cial and investment banking activities. While
some banks actively exchange information bet-
ween these departments, others have estab-
lished fire walls, trying to evade possible con-
flicts of interest. Banks can in principle be re-
quired also by law to establish Chinese walls
between their investment and commercial bank-
ing activities, but the implementation of such
requirements appears to be difficult. These
problems can be exacerbated by the degree of
cross-ownership in the banking system through
investment funds.
Market-based evidence on the impact of in-
vestment funds in general and bank-controlled
funds in particular on the firms that they own
seems to suggest few problems, though. A re-
cent study by Claessens et al. (1997) finds that
firms in which bank-controlled funds own large
stakes actually exhibit a higher market value
than firms with either dispersed ownership or
with large stakes owned by non-bank-con-
trolled funds. However, the study covers only
firms actively traded on the Prague exchange
where trading is mostly between or through the
major banks. By contrast, the bulk of stock
trading is taking place outside the exchange at
undisclosed prices (Triska 1995; Pistor and
Spicer 1996). The information content of the
prices quoted on the Prague exchange may
therefore be quite low.
Because the success of the Czech voucher
privatization ultimately depends on the incen-
tives for the investment funds (and the banks)
to perform effective corporate governance, fi-
nancial market legislation is crucial. Yet, the
authorities have only hesitantly moved to im-
prove the relevant laws and to implement
Western standards. Although the number of
listed companies on the Czech stock market
(1,635 in 1995) and market capitalization (33
percent of GDP) are higher than in many ma-
ture market economies, market turnover (23
percent), i.e., the trading value relative to mar-
ket capitalization, is lower than in e.g. Hungary
or Poland (IFC 1996; World Bank 1996). One
reason for the low turnover is the poor quality
of financial information, the intransparency of
the financial system, and the weak protection of
minority interests. New stock market legis-
lation, which came into effect in July 1996,
tried to address these problems, but the reforms
are generally perceived not to be far-reaching
enough.
Apart from problems with owner control
over firms, there have been problems with the
enforcement of creditor claims as well. The
Czech Republic has been notorious for the
hesitant enforcement of bankruptcy legislation.
Effective bankruptcy legislation is crucial to
enable creditors to intervene in firms failing to
service their debt. Otherwise, creditors may be-
come excessively cautious in their lending be-
cause of the risk of not being able to recover
their loans if the enterprise gets into trouble.
Moreover, poorly designed bankruptcy laws
may give creditors incentives to refinance ail-
ing firms in the hope of keeping them afloat so
that they may eventually be rescued, and at
least some of the loans may be recovered. As a
result, promising new firms may be starved of
credit.
In order to provide the right incentives for
creditors, several points are important. First,
seniority of claims should rest with (secured)
creditors, rather than with the government, the
workers or the owners. Else, creditors cannot
hope to recover a sufficiently large portion of
their loans to make an initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings worthwhile. Second, asset markets
in transition economies are often depressed.
Therefore, creditors may be reluctant to press
for liquidating the assets of a firm due to the
rather low expected returns. Hence, short of li-
quidation, the legislation should include a pos-
sibility for creditors to work out an agreement
with the debtor firm in which debts are written20
down or restructured in return for restructuring
the firm. In order for this kind of work-outs to
be feasible, agreement should require the assent
of a qualified majority of creditors, rather than
unanimity. Third, a firm deadline should be set
before which an agreement must be reached,
and after which liquidation becomes mandat-
ory. Otherwise, work-out negotiations may drag
on forever while the firm is allowed to struggle
on and to waste the remainder of its capital
stock. Finally, in case of liquidation, the court-
appointed liquidators should be afforded fi-
nancial incentives to wind up the firm quickly.
In the Czech Republic, it is only since April
1993 that creditors are legally allowed to take
bankruptcy cases to court (Brom and Orenstein
1994: 898). The bankruptcy law has been
amended twice in order to simplify the process
and to make it more difficult for debtors to
shield themselves from creditor claims. Cre-
ditors enjoy seniority over other claims. On pa-
per, the Czech bankruptcy law does not look
worse than for instance the Polish law. And yet,
the number of bankruptcies has remained small.
Through mid-1996, less than 500 bankruptcy
cases had been opened, none of which involved
a major enterprise, and none of which had been
completed. The major obstacles to the effec-
tiveness of bankruptcy legislation appear to be
excessively cumbersome procedures and inade-
quate resources devoted to the court system,
leading to substantial backlogs in unprocessed
filings and pending cases (Zemanovicova and
Zitnanska 1996). In addition, some creditors are
protected by government guarantees.
This is in marked contrast to Hungary and
Poland where bankruptcies have been used lib-
erally to weed out enterprises which are not
viable. Hungary introduced one of the most
stringent bankruptcy laws in the region in 1991,
forcing firms to self-declare bankruptcy if and
when they were more than 90 days in arrears on
their debts.
2
5 The number of bankruptcy cases
has vastly exceeded those in the Czech Re-
public.
2
6 The strictness of the law led to dis-
ruptive bankruptcy proceedings even in enter-
prises merely facing liquidity crises rather than
being insolvent; hence the requirement to self-
declare bankruptcy in case of payment arrears
was removed in 1993. Nonetheless, bankruptcy
legislation in Hungary has contributed to hard-
ening the budget constraints of Hungarian firms
and to improve financial discipline in both
firms and banks. Even in Poland, where bank-
ruptcy legislation exhibits significant weaknes-
ses in terms of the priority of creditors, several
thousand cases have been filed and several
hundred have been completed (Gray and Holle
1996).
In summary, this section has lend support to
the hypothesis that problems in the corporate
governance of firms are one main reason be-
hind the increase in wages in excess of produc-
tivity and the resulting loss of competitiveness
of Czech firms. It is hardly conceivable how
these corporate governance problems could be
solved without improving the situation in the
banking sector and the functioning of capital
markets at the same time. Simply forcing banks
to divest the shares in enterprises that they hold
(either directly or through investment funds) is
not feasible in the current situation. In view of
the complementarity between efficient banks
and efficient stock markets, reducing the
governance role of banks may also be subopti-
mal from a theoretical point of view.
2
7 How-
ever, if banks are supposed to perform corpo-
rate governance functions and to restructure
firms, the banks themselves must be run ef-
ficiently. In view of the relatively large owner-
ship stakes that the government still holds in
the dominant banks, speeding up bank privati-




IX. What Are the Lessons?
After capital inflows into the transition econ-
omies in Central and Eastern Europe surged in
1993 and 1995, the Czech Republic has witnes-
sed a reversal of (short-term) capital flows and,
in response to increasing current account de-
ficits, had to abandon its fixed exchange rate
regime. External factors, in particular the recent
increase in international interest rates, have
ceteris paribus made the transition economies
less attractive for foreign investors. Yet, our
analysis also suggests that domestic fundamen-
tals can explain the current situation in the
Czech Republic to a great extent.
There are a number of lessons that other
transition economies can take from the Czech
experience. To be sure, increased capital in-
flows have beneficial effects for the process of
economic transformation. They allow higher
domestic investment and provide for a transfer
of know how and new technology. However, in
order to avoid excessive real exchange rate ap-
preciation and unsustainable current account
deficits, appropriate policy responses must be
taken as well. While exchange rate targets may
be used, the authorities must stand ready to
flexibly adjust them to new conditions. Emer-
gency measures such as (temporary) capital
controls and deposit requirements on imports
can hardly be an effective substitute for a suf-
ficient degree of exchange rate flexibility.
Monetary sterilization of capital inflows may
be partially feasible in the very short run but
overall proves to be a rather costly, inefficient,
and counterproductive instrument. Apart from
monetary policy, fiscal and wage policies must
adjust in order to moderate domestic demand.
Hence, the need to reduce government spending
may not only be given in a situation of high
budget deficits.
One of the most important lessons from the
Czech experience is that macroeconomic fac-
tors alone are an imprecise and perhaps mis-
leading indicator of the underlying strength of
an economy. Rather, institutional and micro-
economic conditions must be taken into ac-
count as well. In the Czech Republic, weak fi-
nancial market regulation has reduced the trans-
parency of ownership relations and has pre-
vented the emergence of effective corporate
governance structures conducive to the restruc-
turing of firms. The role of banks is particularly
important. On the one hand, banks have been
assigned an influential role in the corporate
governance of firms. On the other hand, (par-
tial) state-ownership of the banks, the relatively
high share of non-performing loans on their ba-
lance sheets, and weak regulations have re-
duced the incentives of banks to efficiently mo-
nitor enterprises. As a result, productivity
growth was disappointing and was outstripped
by wage growth.
In order to improve the incentive system and
to allow for a better corporate governance role
of banks, the following reforms are particularly
indicative:
(1) Because Czech banks have already been re-
capitalized for a substantial part of their truly
inherited non-performing loans, additional re-
capitalizations would entail moral hazard pro-
blems. Rather, the issue should be addressed by
giving banks more leeway to provision against
their bad loans, i.e., to allow more generous
pre-tax provisions and loan writeoffs. Under
the current practice, which allows only a partial
deductibility of required provisions, paper pro-
fits are de facto being taxed. Furthermore, by
focusing on decentralized loan restructuring
and by creating appropriate incentives for the
banks, banks can be induced to engage in the
restructuring of firms and possibly to recover
some of their classified loans. The results of the
Polish restructuring law show that banks made
use of the enhanced role that was assigned to
them. Incidentally, decentralized debt restruc-
turing utilizes the learning potential of banks
and may lay the basis for a more solid loan as-
sessment in the future.
(2) The hesitant enforcement of the bankruptcy
law has prevented market-based adjustment in
the corporate sector. To speed up the resolution
of bankruptcy cases presently pending and
thereby to encourage the use of bankruptcy to22
work out debt problems, bankruptcy proceed-
ings should be streamlined and the court sys-
tem's resources to deal with bankruptcy cases
should be upgraded. Above all, the political
will to enforce the existing bankruptcy legis-
lation is crucial.
(3) The restricted market access of foreign
banks for at least two years and a substantial
slow-down in bank privatization have contribu-
ted to a preservation of inherited market struc-
tures. Opening up for foreign banks more de-
cisively and in particular allowing foreign
banks to participate in the privatization of the
large commercial banks can help to improve the
efficiency of the banking system and the cor-
porate governance role of banks.
(4) Abandoning universal banking entirely and
switching to a system of specialized banks is
hardly feasible and unlikely to solve the prob-
lems in the Czech corporate sector. Rather, re-
gulation of the investment fund industry should
be improved. In order to encourage funds to
manage their portfolios for the benefit of in-
vestors, funds should be encouraged to register
as open-end unit trusts rather than as joint stock
companies.
Because weak incentives of banks have
eventually contributed to the poor performance
of the Czech economy, the problems in the
banking sector and the recent balance of pay-
ment crisis are merely two sides of the same
coin. Hence, the interaction between these
areas should not be overlooked. The above les-
sons are thus particularly important for Russia
where, similar to the situation in the Czech Re-
public, banks stand at the core of so-called fi-
nancial-industrial groups and are closely linked
to industry.
In order to solve their current problems, the
Czech reformers should continue to follow their
liberal-minded reform strategy but complement
it by appropriate institutional reforms. In fact,
the envisaged EU membership and the needed
adjustment of regulations to common market le-
gislation can provide useful guidance. In this
sense, the current crisis episode has not moved
the Czech Republic farther away from Europe,
but rather has shown the need to implement a
sound (financial) market infrastructure along
Western lines.
Clearly, reducing domestic absorption and
forcing firms to restructure will impose short-
run adjustment costs on the Czech economy.
Unemployment rates will have to go up as the
restructuring of firms takes momentum, re-
ducing the inflation rate will become increas-
ingly difficult after the devaluation of the
Koruna, and the needed reduction of domestic
absorption will not only serve to reduce imports
but also negatively affect demand for domesti-
cally produced goods. As regards the future
outlook for the Czech economy, however, me-
dium to long-run prospects certainly remain fa-
vorable as the fundamentals in the Czech Re-
public are still relatively strong. Potentially sta-
bilizing factors are a high share of investment
in GDP, high shares of machinery and equip-
ment in total imports, a relatively sound fiscal
situation, and the low unemployment which
should ease lay offs. While the dream of a
Czech miracle may indeed by over, decisive
action taken now to improve the institutional
framework can serve to turn the situation
around and to set the economy on a new, sus-
tainable growth path.23
Endnotes
1 Essentially, this would be the definition of contagion employed by Sachs et al. (1996: 10) who claim that "[...] in 1995
contagion did not occur randomly across emerging markets. The Mexican crisis spread to countries with weak funda-
mentals and low reserve ratios, but not to countries with strong fundamentals or high reserve ratios."
2 The decline in net capital inflows in 1994 as compared to the previous year is due to a substantial capital outflow of
$17.1 billion from Russia. Hence, capital inflows into transition economies excluding Russia have increased. This sec-
tion mainly draws on the data provided in the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (IMF 1996). These data
may divert from other sources. In order to ensure comparability of the data across countries, a common source of infor-
mation was used nevertheless.
3 Other sources put the net inflow of foreign capital into Central Europe and the Baltic's (excl. Russia) only at about $31
billion for 1995 (UNECE 1996: 143).
4 These numbers were calculated on information given in PlanEcon (1996a).
' This figure was calculated on the basis of data on capital inflows taken from CNB (1997a) and GDP as given by the
EBRD (1996).
6 Indeed, no country can forever sustain an increase in the ratio of foreign debt to GDP. Hence, capital inflows as percent
of GDP will eventually have to come down to the growth rate of GDP if they are to be sustainable. For a number of
structural reasons, the Czech Republic may be unable to replicate the impressive growth performance of the Asian tiger
economies (Sachs and Warner 1996). Thus, capital inflows to the Czech Republic would have to remain in the range of
no more than 5 percent of GDP in the long run.
' The following section draws heavily on Backe (1996) who provides an excellent survey of the current and capital ac-
count restrictions in the Visegrad countries and in Slovenia.
8 For Poland, portfolio capital has not been a separate statistical item until very recently.
9 See, for example, Dornbusch et al. (1995), Edwards (1995), Bruno (1995), Langhammer and Schweickert (1995) for dis-
cussions of recent episodes of balance of payments crises in Latin America and Finland.
!0 Macroeconomic policy inconsistencies such as excessive fiscal deficits, often financed through money creation, have
been prominent in many Latin American crises. The experience of Mexico at the end of 1994 and of Chile in 1982 show
that indexation of wages and prices can derail an exchange-rate based reform program even in the absence of fiscal laxi-
tude.
1
1 The figures for labor productivity growth are based on output rather than value-added and on constant prices. They may
understate true productivity growth because they fail to capture quality improvements as well as savings in material in-
puts. These caveats in principle apply to all transition economies. However, a recent study based on enterprise-level data
argues that variable factor productivity through 1994 actually grew fastest in the Czech Republic (Pohl et al. 1996).
1
2 Over the entire 1990-1996 period, real wage growth have remained somewhat below productivity growth in the Czech
Republic, but in Hungary and Poland, productivity has risen significantly faster than real wages (Table 4).
" Infrastructure projects account for a large part of these investments. Hence, these investments may not have an immedi-
ate impact on the short-run productivity of firms while contributing to improved investment conditions in the medium to
long term.
1
4 Reserve requirements were reduced again on May 8, 1997 (CNB 1997b).
" That is, sterilization policies have not been completely ineffective. To be sure, capital inflows have, among other factors,
been responsible for the fact that the CNB missed its M2-targets in the years 1992 through 1995.
1" These costs arise because a central bank which sterilizes net capital inflows gives up domestic assets which yield high
interest rates (including a risk premium on domestic assets) in exchange for relatively low-interest foreign assets.
1' In 1995, the CNB had also introduced a fee on foreign exchange transactions of commercial banks and limited the open
foreign exchange position of the banks.
!° Details on the stabilization and recovery program of the government coalition adopted on May 28, 1997, are given on
the Internet page of the Czech news agency CTK: http://www.ctknews.com/special/docu.htm
1
9 For a more detailed analysis of banking system reform in the Czech Republic and in other transition economies see Buch
(1996).
2^ See Buch (1997b) on the role of foreign banks for the transition economies.
2
1 In 1995, new legislation became effective that allows banks to create some of their mandatory loan loss provisions out of
pre-tax profits but not the full amount.
To some extent, banks have covered their increased foreign exchange exposure through off-balance sheet activities.
However, detailed data about the volume of these off-balance sheet items is not available.
2^ In the second wave open-end and closed-end unit trusts were also permitted.24
2
4 In mid-1994 for instance, the discount on shares of the top ten investment privatization funds ranged from 28 to 78 per-
cent (Egerer 1995).
2
5 For discussions of Hungary's experience with bankruptcies see Borish and Noel (1996), Gray et al. (1995) and Szanyi
(1995).
2
6 There have been more than 38,000 cases under the Bankruptcy Law in Hungary through the first quarter of 1996 (EBRD
1996; Gray et al. 1995). This number includes both bankruptcy proper and liquidation cases, the difference being that
bankruptcy proceedings are intended to work out debt problems, while liquidation is intended to close down unviable
enterprises.
2
7 See also Buch (1997a). Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995) provide empirical evidence for the complementarity between
banking and financial market development.
2° Recently, the Czech Ministry of Finance has announced plans to privatize also the large state-owned banks, but no de-
tails have been released as yet.25
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